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Managed EDR

Endpoint detection and response, tuned to your environment and managed by your FDSE.

Zaun's Managed EDR module provides endpoint detection and response that's tuned to your specific environment, not generic out-of-the-box rules that generate noise.

How It Works

Your FDSE works with your EDR platform to:

  • Tune detection rules to your environment, reducing false positives
  • Build custom detections for threats specific to your organization
  • Create runbooks for every detection, so your team knows exactly how to respond
  • Review findings and provide context before escalating

Supported EDR Platforms

PlatformFull SupportCustom DetectionsManaged Response
CrowdStrike FalconYesYesYes
SentinelOneYesYesYes
Microsoft Defender for EndpointYesYesPartial
Carbon BlackYesPartialPartial

What Zaun Adds to Your EDR

Beyond Alert Triage

Most MDR providers just triage alerts. Zaun goes further:

  • Detection Engineering: Custom rules built for your environment
  • Runbook Documentation: Every detection has a documented response procedure
  • Weekly Coverage Shipping: New detections deployed every week
  • Tuning & Optimization: Continuous reduction of false positives

Investigation Transparency

Every finding includes:

  • Full evidence trail showing what was analyzed
  • Detection logic explanation
  • Recommended next steps from the runbook
  • Historical context for similar findings

Specific Use Cases

Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBin) Abuse

An attacker uses legitimate Windows binaries like certutil.exe, mshta.exe, or regsvr32.exe to download and execute malicious payloads, bypassing application allowlists. Stock EDR rules generate noise on these common admin tools. Your FDSE tunes CrowdStrike Falcon or SentinelOne detections to tell the difference between legitimate admin usage and attacker abuse based on your environment's baseline.

Credential Dumping via LSASS

An attacker attempts to dump credentials from the LSASS process using tools like Mimikatz, comsvcs.dll, or ProcDump. Zaun detects the LSASS access event in CrowdStrike or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint telemetry and correlates it with the parent process, command line arguments, and user context.

Ransomware Precursor Activity

Before deploying ransomware, attackers typically disable security tools, delete shadow copies, and stage data for exfiltration. Zaun builds multi-stage detections in SentinelOne or CrowdStrike that chain together:

  • vssadmin delete shadows or wmic shadowcopy delete
  • Service stop commands targeting backup and security services
  • Rapid file enumeration across network shares
  • Unusual use of archival tools like 7z.exe or rar.exe

macOS Persistence via LaunchAgent

An attacker installs a LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon plist on macOS endpoints to maintain persistence. Default EDR rules may not cover non-standard persistence paths. Your FDSE writes custom detections for CrowdStrike Falcon that monitor plist creation in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/ with exclusions for known-good software in your environment.

Lateral Movement via RDP and SMB

After initial compromise, an attacker moves laterally using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) or SMB with stolen credentials. Zaun detects unusual RDP login patterns, like a workstation-to-workstation RDP session or RDP from a non-admin user, by analyzing CrowdStrike or Defender authentication telemetry.

Supply Chain Binary Execution

A compromised update for a legitimate tool (e.g., a signed binary from a trusted vendor) executes unexpected child processes or makes network connections to command-and-control infrastructure. Zaun builds detections that baseline expected process trees for your installed software and flag deviations.

Linux Container Escape

An attacker breaks out of a Docker container on a production Linux host by exploiting a kernel vulnerability or misconfigured capabilities. Zaun monitors CrowdStrike Falcon for Linux or SentinelOne for container escape indicators like nsenter usage, chroot calls, or unexpected mount operations from container processes.

Integrations

IntegrationSignal TypeWhat It Provides
CrowdStrike FalconEndpoint telemetryProcess execution, file writes, network connections, DNS
SentinelOne SingularityEndpoint telemetryStoryline-based process trees, threat indicators
Microsoft Defender for EndpointEndpoint telemetryProcess events, network connections, file activity
Carbon Black CloudEndpoint telemetryProcess execution, binary analysis, network
CrowdStrike Falcon IdentityIdentity signalsLateral movement, credential theft, AD changes
SlackAlert deliveryFinding notifications, runbook links, escalation
PagerDutyIncident mgmtOn-call routing, incident creation, escalation
JiraTicketingFinding tracking, investigation documentation
MITRE ATT&CKFrameworkDetection mapping to techniques and sub-techniques

Configuration

# Example: EDR monitoring policy
edr:
  platform: crowdstrike
  monitoring:
    - process_execution
    - file_modifications
    - network_connections
    - registry_changes

  custom_detections:
    enabled: true
    auto_deploy: false  # Require FDSE review before deployment

  alerting:
    severity_threshold: medium
    channels:
      - slack: "#security-alerts"
      - pagerduty: security-oncall

Next Steps